INTRODUCTION
Should there be patents on financial methods? While the past decade has witnessed the development of a growing debate about what the boundaries of patentable subject matter are, one of the most argumentative of these discussions revolved around the patentability of financial methods.
The patentability of business methods and financial methods received judicial imprimatur 1 Circuit) has questioned the soundness of the policy of extending patent protection to this type of subject matter and concluded that Bilski's method for hedging the consumption risk deriving from selling a commodity at fixed price was not patentable. Through this decision, the court significantly restricted the ability of inventors to obtain patents on financial methods as well as on several other inventions in different fields. Indeed, after In re Bilski 4 , to secure a patent on a process was no longer sufficient to show that an invention produces "a useful, concrete and tangible result." An applicant would now need to demonstrate also that her invention was either tied to a machine or transformed an article into a different state or thing. In response, Bilski petitioned for a writ of certiorari that the Supreme Court granted. The resulting decision, however, did not shed much light on the many issues raised by Bilski
.
On one hand, the Court reaffirmed the patentability of business methods but, on the other hand, it did not produce significant guidance on the proper way to identify patentable processes. Specifically, the Court clarified that, although the Federal Circuit's machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for determining the patentability of certain inventions, it represents an "important clue" 6 to accomplish this task. Finally, the Court invited the Federal Circuit to develop other "limiting criteria that further the purposes of the Patent Act." 7 Consequently, investigating into the aftermath of State Street, most significantly its impact on innovation in the financial industry, becomes very important. Indeed, such an investigation can generate useful information on how the patent system operates in certain areas and contribute to an informed design of the aforementioned "limiting criteria" i.e. contribute to the design of limiting criteria that, in practice, further the purpose of the Patent Act of incentivizing creative efforts. One way to accomplice this task is to discuss patent protection with individuals involved in the production of financial inventions.
Given this argument, the objective of this research is to use structured interviews with financial innovators as a way to provide the market participants' perspectives about the patentability of financial methods. Part I of this article discusses the methodology adopted for this series of interviews. Part II describes the collected data and attempts to reconcile patent theory with reality. Finally, the conclusion provides a summary of 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 561 U.S. at 3228 (2010). 7 Id. at 3232. my interviews, results and analysis and points to their significance for determining patentable subject matter.
I. THE INTERVIEWS
Qualitative investigations have the advantage of providing results that can increase our understanding of participants' viewpoints. 8 I therefore decided to conduct a qualitative study that included interviews with market participants to expose the significance of patent protection for individuals engaged in financial innovation. Although not generalizable, the resulting data is still useful for the way it represents a range of perspectives on the incentive patent protection has provided to inventors in the financial industry after State Street. 9 The next Part provides a full description of this qualitative investigation.
A. Method
Before moving on to a detailed analysis of the conducted interviews, it is important to note that for this project "market participants" will refer to individuals in the U.S. 10 who occupy positions requiring a certain degree of knowledge about the creative process of financial methods. The logic behind this recruitment of participants operating within the U.S. was due to the fact that is where the State Street 11 decision is expected to have produced the strongest effect. 12 This means that regardless of whether their companies operate at an international or a domestic level, the creative process in which the subjects are involved occurs primarily within the U.S. The characteristics of this study's participants and their companies are provided in the next Subpart.
Participants
To perform a qualitative investigation, I created a non-random sample of individuals working in the U.S. for different types of financial 8 
Id.
9 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d 1368. 10 It is worth mentioning that the U.S. is virtually the only country in which financial methods can be patented.
11 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d 1368. 12 In order for patent protection to constitute an incentive, individuals must know about the possibility of obtaining a patent for their inventions. Thus, it is plausible to infer that the result of a decision such as State Street has higher chances to be known and, thus, to produce the desired effect, within its legal system. companies. Since the goal of this part of the research is to provide a wide range of financial innovators' perspectives, I recruited interviewees who held positions that impinged upon different levels of the financial methods' creative process. A complete list of the roles held by this study's participants is reported in Table 2 . It includes top managers, portfolio managers, product managers, quants, investment bankers, investment advisers and business managers. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the interviews in relation to the interviewees' positions.
To avoid reporting the viewpoint of just one segment of the targeted industry, I also recruited individuals working for companies of different kinds and sizes. In fact, the significance of patent protection for a local commercial bank can be substantially different from that of a multinational brokerage firm: the former may be interested in acquiring a patent to attract investors, the latter to defend itself from its competitors. Table 3 presents a summary of the participants' companies, including investment banking and securities dealing companies, commercial banks, software publishers and securities brokerages firms. Blackrock, 13 JP Morgan, 14 Moody's KMV, 15 MSCI 16 and UBS 17 are represented, among others. These companies are classified as small, medium and large, depending on whether their revenues volume is less than $100 million, between $100 million and $1 billion or over $1 billion dollars. As illustrated in Figure 2 , 17% of the companies contacted were small, 39% were medium and 44% were large. Figure 3 describes the percentage of the sample that the contacted companies occupy, in relation to their industries. The two most prominent industries in the sample are "Investment Banking and Securities Dealing" and "Securities Brokerage." 18 "Portfolio Management" and "Securities Brokerage" are two separate industries. In this case the company belongs to both of the specified industries with equal weight. 19 Id. 20 Id. Finally, a total of 29 interviews were conducted, of which seventeen were about the production of financial methods and twelve were about the consumption of financial methods. Snowball sampling 22 was used to recruit participants for this study. A full description of this process can be found in Subpart 3. Figure 4 additionally summarizes the distribution of the interviews in relation to company size whereas Figure 5 describes the distribution of the interviews in relation to the companies' industry. More than 50% of the interviews were conducted with individuals working for either investment banking and securities dealing companies or for portfolio management companies. A detailed description of the questions used to interview the participants is reported in the next Subpart. 
Material
As mentioned in Part I.1, I conducted structured interviews with financial market participants in order to collect the necessary data. Structured interviews require the creation of a set of questions that are then administered to the informants during the interviews.
23
The interviews are strictly limited to the predetermined questionnaire, with no flexibility for impromptu digressions or follow-up questions. 24 The advantage of this particular method of interviewing is that it provides comparable data from which themes and patterns can be identified. 25 However, because of its rigid format and the fact that the researcher herself prepared the questionnaire, structured interviews also present a higher risk of producing data that is biased by the investigator's a priori theories. 26 To reduce this risk, I adopted a two-step process involving a series of informal pilot interviews with a smaller group of individuals. The results of this initial investigation were subsequently used as a basis for formulating the questions adopted in the final set of interviews. Thus, input separate from my theories explicitly informed the questionnaires.
More specifically, two questionnaires were created to perform this research. The first focused on the production of financial methods and involved twelve questions that explored the following issues:
• the interviewee's viewpoint on financial innovation;
• the interviewee's viewpoint on incentives to innovate in the financial industry; • the interviewee's opinion about the level of competition in the financial market, and • the interviewee's knowledge of the possibility of patenting financial methods and her opinion about the effectiveness of this measure in fostering innovation in the financial industry. The second questionnaire focused, on the other hand, on the consumption of financial methods and involved six questions that explored the following issues:
• the interviewee's viewpoint about financial innovation; • the interviewee's viewpoint about the sophistication of today's financial market compared to the past, and • the interviewee's opinion about the level of competition inherent in today's financial market. The complete list of questions used in both sets of interviews is included in the Appendix.
Finally, Figure 6 reveals that more than 50% of the interviews about the production of financial methods were conducted with individuals working for companies whose industry was either "Investment Banking and Securities Dealing" or "Commercial Banking." No interviews exploring the consumption of financial methods were conducted with individuals working in the "Investment Banking" or the "Investment advice" industry. As evidenced by Figures 8 and 9, the majority of the interviews on the production and on the consumption of financial methods were with individuals working for large companies. 
Procedure
As mentioned in Subpart 2, snowball sampling was used to recruit the study participants. Snowball sampling is a technique in which an initial group of individuals is sampled for a first round of interviews.
27 Then, a sample for the second round of interviews is created by recruiting individuals identified by the participants in the first round. 28 Subsequently, the second round participants identify potential new interviewees, and the sample for a third round of interviews is selected.
29
The investigator repeats this process as many times as necessary to reach the desired number of total participants for the specific study. 30 Thus, from round to round, the overall size of the study' sample grows like a snowball.
31
The main advantage of this technique is that it uses the participants' relationships with other individuals to identify interviewees of interest to the research, and thus facilitates the recruitment of knowledgeable interviewees. 32 Nevertheless, the sample selected in this way most probably will not be a representative one. In fact, this lack of randomness is the main limitation of snowball sampling. 33 Thus, this technique is mostly used for qualitative studies such as this one. 34 Specifically, in this case I began recruiting participants by building on the personal relationships I have with three individuals who work for financial companies and whose positions require them to be involved in the production and/or consumption of financial products. 35 I conducted the first round of interviews with these participants and, at the end of each meeting, I asked them to recommend two contacts working for financial companies of a possibly different kind and/or size. I repeated this process three times. At the end of the third round, I had completed a total of 29 interviews 36 with both producers and consumers of financial methods. Most of the interviews were conducted either in person or by phone. A few participants asked to answer the questionnaire by email.
37
I stopped recruiting additional participants when the criterion of redundancy was met.
38
In qualitative researches the sample size is considered to be sufficient when the criterion of redundancy is satisfied (i.e. "when the inclusion or recruitment of an additional respondent does not significantly add new information or understanding"). 39 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. at 187. 35 As pointed out by Henckathorn, "ideally, a randomly chosen sample serve as initial contacts, though in practice ease of access virtually always determine the initial sample." See Henckathorn supra note 27 at 174. This means that the initial sample can be biased by the specific characteristic of the research's personal network (school, place of work, personal relationship etc. ) i.e. all the individuals in the initial sample might have similar characteristics other than the one for which they relevant for the specific study that can bias the data they provide. And, because the other participants are referred by those initial individuals the same bias can spread throughout the entire sample of the study. To mitigate this problem I used three independent sources for the initial recruitment. 36 Although at the end of each interview I asked for two additional contacts ultimately most of the participants provided contacts with a number of individuals that varied from zero to four. 37 Since for this project I opted for structured interviews, the fact that a few of the participants requested to answer the questionnaire by email did not represent an obstacle for the collection of the data for this study. Indeed, as mentioned in Subpart I.A.2, in this case no room was left for impromptu transitions and follow-up questions that benefit the most from in person or by phone interviews. Also, all of the individuals who completed questionnaire by email afterward offered to further discuss their answers either by phone or in person.
38 See Johnson supra note 23 at 188. 39 Id.
The interviews' results and their detailed analysis form the subject of the next Part.
II. THE MARKET PARTICIPANTS PERSPECTIVE
The decision to conduct interviews with producers and consumers of financial methods was dictated by the desire to "test" the effect of patent protection introduced in the financial industry in terms of both higher incentives and higher levels of knowledge in the market. In fact, it is expected that if patent protection had any impact on innovation during the time between State Street and In re Bilski, both sides of the financial methods production process -the demand and supply side -should be able to acknowledge such an outcome. The results of the interviews with both groups and their analysis are reported in the following Subparts.
A. Interviews about the Production of Financial Methods
The results of the interviews on the production of financial methods, with respect to the extension of patent protection to them are presented here. The first part of the questionnaire administered to the interviewees involved questions that sought to determine interviewees' viewpoint on financial innovation in general, its dynamics and the specific innovative process of their companies. The second part of the investigation involved a number of questions that focused on the participants' understanding of the mechanisms of patent protection and its extension into the financial industry. Finally, the interviews concluded with the participants' assessment of the level of competition in today's financial market compared to the pre-State Street 40 era. The interviewees unanimously agreed 41 that the past ten years have been a period of significant increase in financial innovation. 42 Participants identified several reasons for this phenomenon, ranging from increased liquidity and lower interest rates 43 power and a better understanding of sophisticated analytical model, 44 to reduction of operational costs of making portfolios and posting collaterals, 45 to globalization 46 and changes in regulations. 47 However, the cause that emerged most consistently from the interviewees' answers was client's demand for products that could generate new sources of revenue and more sophisticated instruments to transfer risk. 48 Only one of the interviewees mentioned the extension of patent protection to financial methods as one of the causes of innovation in the financial industry. 49 Furthermore, when asked about the factors that specifically drove their companies to innovate, 50 these study participants reported that the main factor was the need to satisfy clients' demand and generate profits.
51
Other answers pointed more generically to the search for opportunities to: increase investment returns, 52 build a profile 53 and search for ways to get around regulations 54 and competition. 55 Again, only one of the interviewees mentioned the prospect of obtaining a patent as a motive to innovate in his company. 56 The majority of the interviewees were ambivalent 57 about whether financial industry R&D spending is justifiable in terms of the return that 44 companies receive from innovative products. 58 Two of them emphasized that investing in innovation only makes sense for major Wall Street firms.
59
One of the participants seemed to be open to this option, but only for those products for which there is a clear and significant client demand. 60 On the other hand, five out of seventeen interviewees were in favor of R&D spending, 61 because, as one of them explained, this kind of strategy puts companies ahead of the learning curve for a few years and, by the time other producers became competitive, innovators have a chance to consolidate their hold on clients, to the point that it becomes inconvenient for them to change providers.
62
With respect to the issue of financial companies holding the exclusive right to sell their innovative products, 63 interviewees were split. 64 Those in favor of this solution emphasized the importance of being able to charge monopoly prices. 65 They also stressed that "without patent protection small businesses would be defenseless."
66
Two of the participants wanted patent protection for this subject matter, but only for a short period of time. 67 In contrast, those who did not support exclusive rights for financial innovations were concerned about the fact that such rights would ultimately divert their company's focus away from maintaining satisfied clients, 68 who liked "open architecture with the ability of using best practice rather than Furthermore, a top manager of one of the biggest U.S. investment banks did not think that exclusive rights on financial inventions would increase her company's value. As she explained it:
[I]f … products were easily patentable, on the whole
was able to persuade the patent office that they had been the ones to invent the product in 1998, it would make a serious dent to [its] revenues. (Not to mention really hurt customers due to the monopolistic pricing).
70
The interviewees were also substantially split 71 on the issue of the temporary absence of competition for certain financial products.
72 Three participants were unsure about their position on this point; specifically, one of them explained that it really depends on the period of time during which the monopoly persists.
73 She asserted that financial firms "tend to accrue some short-term benefit from being the inventor of a really good product," 74 both because of the reputation that they develop with certain clients and because it takes months for their competitors to acquire the relevant information about the new product and fully understand it. 75 In her opinion, a monopoly that lasted for an amount of time equivalent to that needed for competitors to catch up with the innovator, i.e. something on the order of six months, would probably not do much harm to the market or the clients. 76 However, she doubted that this solution would be workable from an administrative point of view because she expected 70 See Interview with P5 supra note 45. 71 She concluded that by the time the "how innovative" problem was resolved, the six-month period would have long expired. 78 The main concern of the interviewees who opposed a temporary monopoly power on certain financial products rested on the likelihood of hurting consumers' interests.
79
They pointed to the fact that in this sector, consumers protection is weak and competition mitigates this problem. 80 They emphasized how an absence of competition not only results in inefficient pricing 81 but also reduces the companies' incentive to improve existing products. 82 Finally, from the companies' perspective, they pointed out the fact that:
It is difficult to build a market for a product if there is little or no competition. Having competition [is thus advantageous because]:
• competitors help with marketing the benefits of a product; Other participants did not envision any problem with a monopoly on financial products 84 for two reasons. Firstly, they considered the absence of competition to be simply equivalent to a regular first mover- 77 Id. participant P5 explained that defining "'how innovative' something needs to be to get protection would be very difficult [because] [o]n a constant basis, trades are done which build on multiple different precedents, or tweak just a few things from a previous trade." 78 advantage 85 and, secondly, they believed that many of the downsides associated with patent protection would be ultimately cured by licensing. 86 Six out of seventeen interviewees were unaware of the fact 87 that securities and financial processes could be patented.
88 Table 5 summarizes the roles and industries to which these participants belong. No particular element emerges from their profiles that could explain their lack of knowledge regarding patent protection in their industry; thus, this result does not appear to be related to either the industries or the roles of this study's participants. The interviewees who knew about patent protection for this subject matter acquired this information principally from in-house seminars and from their companies' patent activities. Again, the viewpoint of a top manager of one of the major U.S. investment banks is significant: known. It seems firms only get patents for purposes of marketing to clients: 'we invented this -look, we got the patent.' This game seems to be over for now -I haven't heard of anyone taking out a patent in my area in 3-4 years, while I heard of a few instances before then. 89 In addition, of those who were aware of patent protection for financial methods, only four 90 were convinced that it could foster innovation in their industry. 91 One of these subjects indicated the role that the patent system played on the "explosion" of data processing as one example of what she expected to happen in finance after State Street.
92
Finally, although virtually all of the interviewees agreed 93 that today's financial market is more competitive than it was ten years ago, 94 only two of them were concerned about their competitors' patenting strategies. 95 In this respect, one participant specified that the real problems "come not from [their] true competitors, but from 'patent trolls. '" 96 The causes identified for the increased competitiveness in the financial market ranged from the higher involvement of foreign banks in the U.S. (and vice versa), 97 to a larger number of financial instruments present in the market and to a change in investors who are much more demanding today than they were in the past. 
100
The first part of the questionnaire used for this investigation consisted of two questions designed to determine participants' sense of the financial innovation that has emerged in the past ten years. The second part of the interview was dedicated to the interviewees' understanding of the financial market and of its players. Finally, the last question focused on the competitiveness of today's financial market for product providers.
There was little variation in the interviewees' answers with respect to the consumption of financial methods. The participants concurred fairly consistently on one of the possible outcomes. In fact, they stated unanimously 101 that the number of new types of securities and new types of financial processes had increased over the past ten years. 102 With the exception of one participant, 103 they also concurred 104 on the fact that the products available today are different from those in the past. 105 According to interviewees, the main difference between present and past products has been the explosion of derivatives 106 that characterized the present period. Specifically, one participant said that "various new securities were invented to cover specific investment needs."
107 From a different perspective, she added that, "[today's] processes are more complex and mathematically oriented."
108
Most of the interviewees 109 thought that the financial market had become more sophisticated in the last ten years compared to past decades. 110 The reasons for such a change ranged from client's demand for certain kinds of products, to an increase in the amount of money present in the market, to more competition. 111 However, two participants disagreed with the rest of the sample because, as they explained, the term "sophistication" also meant to them that something had improved, i.e. had become "more in tune with their needs."
112
They found today's market being characterized by more products that are more complex but that are not necessarily of higher quality. 113 Thus, according to them, today's market is definitely more difficult to understand than it was ten years ago but it is not necessarily more sophisticated. 114 Furthermore, nine out of twelve interviewees 115 thought that in order to be competitive, a company today needs more advanced products, funds).
118 One of the participants who disagreed with the majority of the interviewees, however, emphasized that, at this time, in order to be successful, what is needed is the "right" kind of products rather than the more "advanced" ones, but also more regulation and enforcement thereof. 119 Another interviewee whose business is market-neutral equity strategy did not think that there was a need for more advanced products, "[because]… value is created via the underlying asset the security represents … more than … by purchasing incrementally more sophisticated products … to manage risk." 120 Finally, one of the interviewees said that the need for more advanced products depends on the consumers and market segment.
121
From a different perspective, financial product providers were considered to be sufficiently innovative 122 by 50% of the interviewees.
123
Of these participants, two thought that providers could be even "too innovative," to the point of creating risk that investors did not foresee.
124
Four interviewees out of twelve did not have a clear position on this matter, while two did not find providers innovative enough. One of them explained this by pointing to the high complexity of today's instruments and markets, and how better tools are needed more than ever before to successfully deal with them. 125 Indeed, since returning to a simpler stage of financial development is not realistic anymore, the best course of action would certainly seem to be developing better i.e. more sophisticated products that can be fully understood. 126 Finally, the interviewees were markedly unanimous 127 about the level of competition faced by financial product providers today. 128 the belief that because a significant growth in the demand for sophisticated products can generate greater returns, more subjects entered the financial market in the past ten years than in past decades. 129 Indeed, as one of the interviewees emphasized, "the pie [got] larger and attracted more market participants."
C. Discussion
This section provides a brief analysis of the investigation summarized in the previous Subparts. From the perspective of the production of financial methods, a first observation is that the results of the interviews confirm the presence of significant financial innovation in the ten years between State Street 131 and In re Bilski.
132
The interviewees identified several financial causes for this phenomenon, the most important of which appeared to be client demand for more advanced products. This fact emerged for the market in general and for the individual companies; furthermore, it is consistent with the financial literature. 133 On the other hand, patent protection -the focus of this research -has been reported by only one interviewee as a possible incentive to innovate in the financial industry.
Conflicting opinions revolved around the issue of exclusive rights on financial products. From the companies' perspective, some interviewees did not see a clear advantage to having patent protection because they feared a loss in revenue derived from the ability to trade their competitors' products. In other words, according to them, it is more advantageous in this industry for a company to be able to copy their competitors' products than to have the exclusive right to sell its own products. The reason for this is, firstly, that, innovators do enjoy an initial 134 de facto monopoly on their inventions and, secondly, that the profit margins in dealing with new products still exist even when competitors begin to copy them.
Furthermore, from a product perspective, patent protection does not appear to be optimal because clients are reluctant to invest in very "exotic" inventions for which there is no established market. In this regard, interviewees expressed a concern about driving their clients away not to mention hurting them. According to this study's participants, competition (i.e. copying) is necessary in the financial market because it makes the products both known and widespread. However, there were conflicting opinions, because a number of interviewees did not see much difference between having a legal monopoly and having a de facto one, i.e., a first-mover advantage for innovative products.
Moreover, since the interviewees were also ambivalent about the benefit of investing in innovation (i.e. higher returns for their companies derived from active R&D spending), it appears plausible to conclude that, in this industry, the interest in the main tool used by other sectors to recoup these kinds of expenses is not of great significance. The lack of interest for patent protection is also evidenced by the fact that about onethird of the interviewees did not even know about the possibility of patenting their inventions. Among those who did know, only two were somewhat worried about their competitors' patent activity. One of the participants explained:
[We are] not concerned about it. It seems to be a farce, just a marketing ploy. We've never had our legal counsels advising us that we need to be careful not to infringe on a patent (naturally we ask them to take a look), and the whole Street has executed structures on which one bank markets to clients that he holds a patent.
135 134 The duration of this period is probably different for different products. Both P5 and P11 discussed this point but with a different length of time in mind; P5 talked about a six-month periods whereas P11 considered a couple of years of first-mover advantage. A possible explanation for this result is that probably the amount of time needed to reverse a security is different than the one required for an investing model or other products; see Interview with P5 supra note 45 and Interview with P11 supra note 62. 135 See Interview with P5 supra note 45.
Some relevant deductions can also be made from an analysis of the interviews about the consumption of financial methods, the most important of which is the general consensus that characterized the interviewees' opinions on the issues discussed.
Similar to the interview results on the production of financial methods, results from the investigation on the consumption of financial methods confirmed that the past decade has been a period of great financial innovation, in which the new products that emerged were not only more numerous, but also significantly different, from their predecessors.
From this investigation it appears that the financial market has become much more sophisticated than in the past and that companies need to really on advance products in order to successfully operate in it. Nevertheless, the participants were ambivalent about the issue of whether providers of financial products are innovative enough. Thus, a possible assessment of today's condition of the financial market is that, notwithstanding the recent explosion of new products, there is still a significant need for innovation. From a different perspective, it is interesting that the entrance of many more players was not sufficient to completely satisfy this need for innovation.
Finally, and more specifically for the purpose of this study, it is possible to say that in considering the increased competitiveness of the financial market, the persistent demand for more advanced products and the primary purpose of patent protection to foster innovation, significant doubts begin to emerge about the role that the patent system had in this sector after State Street. Nevertheless, the results of the interviews discussed in this article seems to indicate that innovators in the financial industry did not entirely appreciate the benefits provided by patent protection and, supposedly, continued to operate (at least up to a certain level) through trade secrets.
In conclusion, is it possible to "reconcile" the results of this investigation with prospect theory? To answer this question it is necessary to understand whether the advantages produced by the patent systems and highlighted by prospect theory constitute real pluses for the financial industry as they are for other fields.
While it is possible to argue that the financial industry could operate more efficiently if its companies would reduce duplicative investments in finding solutions for their clients and share information with their competitors, other aspects associated with patent protection are more questionable.
In particular, it seems that financial companies have less of a need to reduce the costs derived from entering into contracts with firms that possess complementary information and resources.
141
This is because most of the required information and resources are provided directly by their clients who, as discussed in the previous part, are the driving force of innovation in this field--not only in terms of supplying "inspiration" for additional inventions but also in terms of financing and accessing markets.
Similarly, clients are the main incentive for investments in improvements.
142
In these cases, acquiring control over the main invention through a patent does not determine additional R&D investment in the development of related financial methods, unless clients demand them. Finally, of limited relevance is the saving derived by not having to maintain the secrecy of an invention.
143 This is because, as this study has showed, financial companies want their competitors to copy them and, in this way, signal to the market that their products are valid and needed. 144 It is therefore possible to conclude that the case of the superiority of patent protection over trade secrets is highly questionable in the context of the financial industry.
CONCLUSIONS
Over thirteen years after the issuance of the State Street decision, the patentability of financial methods remains controversial. In re Bilski brought the importance of correctly determining the boundaries of patentable subject matter to everyone's attention. For several years, this aspect of the patent system has been almost completely disregarded. At the heart of the problem is the question of whether the patent system in the specific sector is "doing its job" or, in other words, whether that patent system is fostering the creation of additional business methods.
To answer this question, an empirical study is required. For this reason, I conducted structured interviews with market participants about the production and consumption of financial methods as a subset of business methods. 143 Id. at 279. 144 The fact that financial companies want their competitors to copy them appears to be somewhat in tension with the previous discussion of financial companies relying on trade secrets to protect their inventions see Merges supra note 139. However, this study indicates that financial companies enjoy on average a six months first-mover-advantage in which the invention is kept as a "secret" and monopolist profit is made see e.g. Part II.A supra page 21 and Interview with P5 supra note 45. Subsequently, innovators "expect" their competitors to copy them and, in this way, signal to the market that their invention is valid see e.g. Part II.A supra page 25 and Interview with P1 supra note 46. Furthermore, in 2003 Herrera and Schroth showed that the advantage enjoyed by the first mover mainly comprises information asymmetry and not the invention per se. In other words, they showed that financial innovators retain an advantage over their competitors even when the invention is copied. This is because of the information they acquire from dealing directly with their clients in the development of the invention i. The results of this investigation do not provide direct evidence of the impact of patent protection on financial innovation, but they are quite significant. From this study, it appears that patent protection has not been responsible for the innovation that occurred in the financial industry between State Street and In re Bilski. Indeed, the interviewed market participants were ambivalent about the benefits that both the financial markets and their companies could derive from having exclusive rights on their inventions. During the interviews about the production of financial methods, participants expressed concerns about the possibility of hurting their clients, of not having a market to attract them and ultimately of not being able to produce revenues from trading on their competitors' products. In substance, they provided a description of the financial market and of its dynamics that does not align with the protection of business methods, as currently provided by the patent system.
On the other hand, the interviews about the consumption of financial methods provided useful information about the level of competition in the financial industry and the need for additional innovation and more creative producers. However, no specific effect from the patent system has been identified.
Also, an analysis of this study's results through the lens of prospect theory raises doubts about the superiority of patent protection over trade secrets in the financial industry.
If patent protection did not represent an incentive in the financial industry, though, why did inventors submit so many applications?
145 One of the interviewees suggested that patent protection has been used as a marketing tool to boost companies' profiles. Alternatively, a previous investigation suggests 146 that these patents could not be real financial patents but software patents with a financial component. In this latter case, it would probably make more sense to explore the effect of patents in the software industry rather than in the financial one. Clearly, more investigation is necessary to shed light on this point. 145 See Duffy supra note 1. 146 In a previous article I investigated patent application submitted and patent issued on securities in the ten years between State Street and In re Bilski. Most of the claimed inventions assigned to the subclasses of interest (subclasses 35, 36R and 37 of class 705) represented categories of financial innovations other than securities. Finally, it is important to spend a few moments addressing the significance of this study's results, as they relate to the recent Supreme Court decision on Bilski. As previously discussed, the present investigation shows that after State Street, patent protection did not appear to have produced additional innovations within the financial industry. The obvious consequence of this finding is that the Federal Circuit was right in deciding In re Bilski because in the past ten years, proprietary rights have been granted on financial knowledge, but society has not received anything meaningful in return. Thus, the Supreme Court should have supported a full application of the machine-ortransformation test.
Unfortunately, though, this conclusion does not take into account the way that Bilski involves processes in general and not just financial methods. Because of this, it can have significant implications for innovation in many fields, other than the financial industry, that are of great importance for society and, potentially, could derive significant benefit from patent protection. Now, the Supreme Court has given the Federal Circuit a new opportunity to address this issue in a way that goes beyond the specifics of one industry and more closely reflects the goal of the patent system: to foster innovation. 
